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Abstract: In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between 
inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the long-
run equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent 
of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy 
is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the 
different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. 
Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for 
economic growth may be different.  
 
The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, 
second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an 
income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980’s and 1990’s in the US. The fact that the 
non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the 
distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in 
this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the 
US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in 
explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the 
response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, 
quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 
More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an 
isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium 
follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we 
are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, 
following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory 
carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax 
increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy.  
 
Key words: human capital, inequality, tax reform. 
JEL Classification: J31, O40 
  
Resum: En aquest article s’examina l’efecte de la política impositiva en la relació entre 
desigualtat i creixement en el marc d’un model non-scale amb dos sectors. Amb models del 
tipus non-scale, l’equilibri de llarg termini ve determinat pels paràmetres tecnològics i és 
independent dels instruments de política macroeconòmica. Ara bé, aquesta situació no 
implica que la política fiscal no intervingui en l’activitat econòmica en el llarg termini. De 
fet, té importants efectes en els nivells de variables econòmiques tals com l’estoc de capital 
i la producció. Així doncs, tot i que l’economia creixi a la mateixa taxa en els diferents 
estats estacionaris, les bases pel creixement econòmic poden diferir. 
 
El model té tres aspectes essencials que el caracteritzen. En primer lloc, hem modelat 
l’acumulació d’habilitats; en segon, hem introduït el govern a la funció de producció; 
finalment, hem incorporat un impost sobre la renda per tal de reproduir els canvis fiscals 
que es produiren als Estats Units durant els anys vuitanta i noranta. El fet que els models 
non-scale es trobin associats amb dinàmiques d’ordre elevat ens permet replicar la 
naturalesa de la desigualtat americana de manera força acurada. Així, els resultats obtinguts 
en aquest article ens mostren com el nostre model no només capta l’evolució en el llarg 
termini (Jones, 1995b), sinó que també és capaç d’explicar les fluctuacions econòmiques en 
el curt termini. De fet, es mostra com durant la transició, la resposta del skill premium 
simulat envers els canvis impositius és no-monotònica, seguint el patró de la desigualtat 
americana dels anys vuitanta i noranta. 
 
Més concretament, hem analitzat amb un cert detall la dinàmica fruit de la simulació d’un 
increment i d’una reducció impositives aïllades, tot i comprovant que després d’una 
davallada impositiva, el skill premium segueix una trajectòria inferior a la seguida sense el 
decrement impositiu. Vist això, es pot dir que la desigualtat minva durant els períodes que 
segueixen el canvi fiscal. Per altra banda, després d’un increment impositiu, el skill 
premium roman per sobre de la trajectòria prèvia a l’augment. Per tant, un increment 
impositiu implicaria un nivell de desigualtat superior a l’existent fins aleshores a 
l’economia. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last decade, literature on tax reforms has centered on their macroeconomic 
growth effects. Even though empirical studies come up with low values for the influence of 
taxes on growth, theory has shown that small tax changes can have a large cumulative effect 
on long-run growth. Studies on taxation show mainly how higher taxes tend to discourage 
investment rates (Auerbach and Hassett, 1991; Cummins et al., 1994, 1996) as well as labor 
supply of individuals (Hausman, 1985; Triest, 1990; Mariger, 1995; Eissa, 1996) and 
productivity growth, the latter one by attenuating R&D. Some findings show that working 
hours and labor force participation are only mildly responsive to tax changes. On the other 
hand, in order to have lower taxes, some authors advise of the need to keep the economy as 
close as possible to its full employment potential. Lately, some authors have used 
endogenous growth models to simulate the effects of tax reforms on economic growth 
(Auerbach, 1996; Gale, 1996), finding that a decrease in the distorting effects of the current 
tax structure may lead to a permanent increase in economic growth mainly by enhancing 
national saving rates, thereby increasing the investment rate. In any case, when changing 
taxes, literature puts some emphasis on analyzing the transitional cost distribution, which 
could be crucial for policymakers.  
 
Moreover, one of the interesting points to analyze is the welfare impact of taxes. Actually, 
the welfare impact of unanticipated tax changes is shown to depend on the mechanism 
underlying the production of knowledge, as well as the complementarity between knowledge 
and physical capital. In general, the growth effects stemming from policy actions do not 
impinge on all sectors of the economy equally. Some groups benefit more than others do, 
causing an inevitable change in the income distribution and income inequality. Studies on 
how changes in taxes and transfers tend to reinforce market trends in inequality and poverty 
have been undertaken throughout the literature. Taxes may increase growth if they finance 
public services, buy may decrease growth when used to redistribute income between classes 
and try to decrease inequality, as said by Chang (1998). Since inequality induces more 
redistribution, Perotti (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994) or Benabou (1996) say that it 
would lead to lower economic growth through higher distortion and lower investment. 
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Several papers on political economy of growth have tried to reconcile this idea by 
introducing the decision on taxes depending upon the choice of the median voter. 
 
In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and 
growth in a two-sector non-scale model. The model has three essential features. First, we 
explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the 
production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980’s 
mainly. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it 
to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. 1  
 
The results derived in the paper draw attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model 
not only fits the US data well for the long run (as first shown by Jones, 1995), but also that 
our parameterization of the model is able to track important aspects of the short-run 
evolution of the economy. Specifically, we show that the initial phase of the transitional 
adjustment of the skill premium in response to changes in the tax code is inherently 
nonlinear, a feature that closely follows the US skill premium experienced in the 1980s and 
early 1990’s. 
 
Our simulations also relate well to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of tax 
reforms. Studies examining tax reforms show that higher taxes tend to discourage investment 
rates (Auerbach and Hassett, 1991; Cummins et al., 1994, 1996) and that income taxes seems 
to increase wealth inequality, compared to the distributional neutrality of a consumption tax, 
as some authors have pointed out (Perroni, 1995; Felder, 1997). The empirical studies show 
that the impact of tax changes depends on the mechanism underlying the production of 
knowledge, as well as the complementarity between knowledge and physical capital, a 
feature also shared by our model. 
 
We choose as our benchmark the dramatic changes in the US tax code in the early 1980s, 
and the ensuing, significant changes in the skill premium. Any growth model that seeks to 
                                                 
1 Cross-country evidence on the effect of growth on inequality and on that of inequality on growth is 
inconclusive (see Anand and Kanbur, 1993, Deininger and Squire, 1998, and Forbes, 2000), while historical 
 3
speak to the discussion on policy, taxation, and inequality must be able to replicate key 
events in the data to render its implications relevant. A key feature of the data in the 1980s 
was the non-monotonic nature of the response of the skill premium to changes in the tax 
code. This is a transition that is difficult for a conventional one-sector growth model or a 
two-sector endogenous growth model to explain. This is because in either case the 
transitional adjustment path is a one-dimensional locus and therefore can generate only 
monotonic adjustments. In our simulations, using actual tax rates for the 1980s, we find that 
the model replicates both key steady-the state variables of the economy as well as tracking 
the short-run non-linear transition path of the skill premium fairly closely.  
 
The previous literature on the topic is separated into two strands: the growth and inequality 
literature and the growth and taxation models. Existing explanations for the observed 
patterns of inequality have been based focused on sectoral mobility2 (from agriculture to 
industry), capital market imperfections3, socio political (in)stability and redistribution4, or 
skill-biased technical change5. In contrast, the tax reform literature centered on 
macroeconomic variables, such as employment and accumulation. These studies show how 
higher taxes discourage investment rates (e.g., Auerbach and Hassett, 1991) or labor supply 
(e.g.; Eissa, 1996). Models that actually correlate changes in the tax structure with changes in 
growth (e.g, Auerbach, 1996), focus on the distorting effects of current tax structure and not 
on the productive services that the government might finance – to the benefit of economic 
growth. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the non-scale model with 
endogenous skill formation. Section 3 describes the general equilibrium and stationary states, 
                                                                                                                                                       
and recent time series shows a diversity of experiences (Williamson 1991, 1999, and Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997). For a review see, Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa, (1999). 
2  See Kuznets (1953). 
3  See Galor and Zeira (1993). 
4  See Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1995). 
5  See Eicher (1995), García Peñalosa (1994) and Galor and Tsiddon (1996). 
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and section 4 outlines how Tax Reforms in the 1980’s correlate both with the predictions of 
the model and the evolution of real inequality. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. A Two-sector non-scale economy 
 
We begin by outlining the structure of a two-sector non-scale model that features exogenous 
population growth and endogenously growing physical and human capital. We focus on a 
decentralized economy in which population, N, is assumed to grow at the steady rate 
nNN =& . The government plays a simple role. It taxes final income and uses the proceeds 
to finance the purchases of a productive input that increases productivity in the final output 
sector. 
 
 
2.1. Individual agents 
 
Individual i produces final output, Yi , and gross additions to human capital, Ji , in separate 
sectors, each subject to externalities according to the Cobb-Douglas production functions: 
 
[ ] [ ] GHKKHN cccbibibFi GHKKHY φψθα=  (1a) 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] HKKHN ffeieieJi HKKHaJ φψθ −−−= 111  (1b) 
 
Each individual is endowed with a unit of labor, θ  of which is allocated to the production of 
new output and (1 −θ)  to the production of new human capital. In addition, he allocates a 
fraction ψ  of his current human capital, Hi , to the production of final output, and the 
balance (1 −ψ ) to the accumulation of further human capital. Likewise, he allocates a 
fraction φ  of his physical capital, Ki , to the production of final output and the rest (1 −φ ) to 
the human capital sector. The production of new output is subject to positive externalities 
arising from the aggregate stock of physical capital, K, human capital, H, as well as 
government spending, G , on a productive input, which is in the form of a public good. 
Government services are modeled as being non-rival and non-excludable, constituting a pure 
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public good in the sense of Samuelson (1954). The production of new human capital is 
subject to similar externalities from the aggregate stocks of physical and human capital. The 
constants αF ,  aJ  represent exogenous technological shift factors to the production functions, 
while bi ,  ci ,  ei ,  fi  are the respective productive elasticities.  
 
We assume that all agents in the economy are identical so that aggregate and individual 
quantities are related by 
 
Y = NYi , K = NKi , H = NHi  (2) 
 
Government expenditure is proportional to the aggregate output, in accordance with: 
 
igNYgYG ==  (3) 
 
and substituting (3) into (1a) we can rewrite the production function as: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )GGGHGKGKGHGN cccccccbicbicbFi NHKKHaY −−−−−−= 111111 φψθ   (1a’) 
 
where ( ) GG ccFF ga −≡ 1 1α .  
 
The rate at which the individual accumulates the two types of capital is described by: 
 
(1 ) ( )i y i i i K iK Y C T n Kτ δ= − − − − +&  
( )i i H iH J n Hδ= − +&  
(4a) 
 
(4b) 
 
According to (4a), income is taxed at the rate τy , and in addition we allow for lump-sum 
taxation, Ti . The individual’s net rate of accumulation of both types of capital must allow for 
the rate of the respective rate of depreciation δK , δH , and the need to equip the growing 
population with both types of capital.  
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The individual agent is assumed to maximize the intertemporal utility function: 
 
1
1 −γ Ci( )
1−γ
0
∞∫ e−ρtdt       ρ > 0;  γ > 0  (5) 
 
subject to the production functions (1a)-(1b), the accumulation constraints, (4a)-(4b), and the 
usual initial conditions. His decision variables are: (i) the rate of consumption, Ci; (ii) the 
sectoral allocation of labor,θ , human capital, ψ , and physical capital, φ ; and (iii) the rates 
of accumulation of physical and human capital. The optimality conditions to this problem 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
Ci
−γ =ν i  
( ) θµθτ −=− 11 iNiiyNi JeYbv  
( ) ψµψτ −=− 11 iHiiyHi JeYbv  
( ) φµφτ −=− 11 iKiiyKi JeYbv  
( )
i
i
i
i
K
i
i
K
i
i
yK v
v
K
Je
v
n
K
Yb &−=+−−− ρµδτ1  
( )
i
i
i
i
HH
i
i
i
i
yH H
Jenv
H
Yb µ
µρδµτ
&−=+−−−1  
(6a) 
 
(6b) 
 
 
(6c) 
 
 
 
(6d) 
 
 
(6e) 
 
 
(6f) 
 
together with the transversality conditions: 
 
lim
t→ ∞ν iKie
− ρt = lim
t →∞ µiHie
−ρt = 0  (6g) 
 
where ν i ,  µi  are the respective shadow values of physical capital and human capital. 
 
Equation (6a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of capital. 
Equations (6b), (6c) and (6d) determine the sectoral allocations of labor, human capital, and 
physical capital such that their respective after-tax marginal products are equated across 
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sectors. Equation (6e) equates the marginal return to investing in an additional unit of 
physical capital to the return on consumption, both measured in terms of units of final output. 
Analogously, (6f) equates the marginal return to human capital to the return on consumption, 
both expressed in units of human capital. In both cases the return to the asset reflects the fact 
that the additional unit will be allocated. 
 
 
2.2. The aggregate economy 
 
To derive the behavior of the aggregate economy we first sum (1a’) and (1b) over the N 
individuals in the economy. We may express the resulting quantities in terms of the 
aggregates6: 
 
NHKHKN NHKaY sssF
σσσψφθ=  
( ) ( ) ( ) NHKHKN NHKaJ eeeJ ηηηψφθ −−−= 111  
(7a) 
 
(7b) 
 
where: 
 
G
H
H
G
K
K
G
N
N c
bs
c
bs
c
bs −≡−≡−≡ 1;1;1  
G
K
G
H
G
N
G
HH
H
G
KK
K c
b
c
b
cc
cb
c
cb
−−−−−≡−
+≡−
+≡
111
1;
1
;
1
σσσ  
;1;; KHNHHHKKK eefefe −−≡+≡+≡ ηηη  
 
Next, we introduce the government and consider the aggregate accumulation equations. We 
will assume that the government finances its expenditure in accordance with a balanced 
budget, which aggregated over N individuals, can be expressed as: 
                                                 
6This technology is somewhat more general than Jones (1995a), who specifies σσσσ ≡−== KNA 1 . Eicher 
and Turnovsky (1999) discuss the balanced-growth characteristics of a general two-sector technology, in which 
physical capital enters the production function of new knowledge. The Romer model corresponds to the case 
KNA σσσ −== 1 , 1== AN ηη . 
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τy NYi + NTi = gNYi  (8) 
 
or, in terms of the aggregate quantities: 
 
τyY + T = gY  (8’) 
 
Summing (4a) and (4b) over the individuals in the economy, and applying the government 
budget constraint (8’), the aggregate rates of capital accumulation can be expressed as: 
 
(1 ) KK g Y C Kδ= − − −&  
HH J Hδ= −&  
(9a) 
 
(9b) 
 
where Y, J are defined in (7a), (7b), above. 
 
 
2.3. Balanced growth equilibrium 
 
Before describing the dynamics, we characterize the balanced growth equilibrium. This is 
defined to be a growth path along which all variables grow at constant, but possibly different, 
rates. In accordance with the stylized empirical facts (Romer 1986), we assume that the 
output/capital ratio, Y/K, is constant. A key feature of the non-scale model is that the 
equilibrium percentage growth rates of human and physical capital, ˆ H and ˆ K , respectively 
are determined entirely by production conditions. Taking the differentials of the production 
functions (9a) and (9b), and solving, we obtain: 
 
ˆ H = ηN (1 −σ K ) +σ NηK
(1− ηH )(1 −σ K ) −σ HηK
 
  
 
  n ≡ β Hn  
ˆ K = ˆ Y = ˆ C = σ N (1 − ηH ) + σHηN
(1− ηH )(1 −σ K ) −σ HηK
 
  
 
  n ≡ β Kn  
 
(10a) 
 
(10b) 
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and thus the per capita growth rate of output (capital) is: 
 
( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) KHKH
KNHHKNHH nnY ησση
ηηησσσση
−−−
−+++−++−=−
11
111
ˆ  
 
(10c) 
 
It is evident from (10a) and (10b) that the magnitudes of the relative sectoral growth rates 
depend upon the assumed production elasticities in conjunction with the population growth 
rate. Equation (10c) implies that countries converge to identical output per capita growth 
rates if either their production technologies are identical, or their production functions exhibit 
constant returns to scale. If production technologies differ across countries, growth rates 
exhibit conditional convergence. Jones (1995a) specifies output to be constant returns to 
scale in physical capital and knowledge-adjusted labor, AN. The striking feature of the 
equilibrium growth rate in the Jones model is that per capita consumption, per capita output 
and capital, and technology all grow at a common rate determined by: (i) the growth rate of 
labor, and (ii) the elasticities of labor and knowledge in the knowledge-producing sector 
alone. Any characteristic of the final output sector is irrelevant. This contrasts with the 
determination of per capita output (capital) growth rates in (10c), which in general depend 
upon the technological parameters in both sectors. It contrasts even more sharply with the 
general production function considered by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999), in which case the 
growth rate of technology also depends upon output elasticities.  
 
The fact that (10c) implies that the per capita growth rate of output in general depends upon 
the population growth rate is somewhat controversial. Jones (1995a) provides an extensive 
discussion of the relevance of this class of growth model, in light of the mixed evidence on 
the correlation between population growth and output growth (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-
Martín 1995). He emphasizes that this aspect of the model, which is a direct consequence of 
non-constant returns to scale, relies foremost on the creation of new technology, and on the 
growth of effective researchers. A zero effect of population on output growth is consistent 
with either (i) increasing returns to scale in one sector, offset by appropriate decreasing 
returns to scale in the other; or (ii) constant returns to scale in both sectors. In particular, 
scale models of growth attain non-zero growth in the absence of population growth by 
imposing constant returns to scale in the accumulated factors, K and H. Thus AK or Lucas-
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Romer type growth models require the knife-edge assumption that 
ηH + ηK = 1, and σH +σ K = 1.  
 
Finally, the possibly differential equilibrium growth rates of physical capital and knowledge 
are reflected in the growth rates of their respective shadow values, µ,v . Using the optimality 
conditions (6), they can be shown to grow in accordance with (where since agents are 
identical we drop the subscript i): 
 
( )nv KH ββµ −=− ˆˆ  (10d) 
 
 
3. Dynamics of a two-sector model 
 
To derive the equilibrium dynamics about the balanced growth path we define the following 
stationary variables:  
 
y ≡ Y Nβ K ; k ≡ K Nβ K ;  c ≡ C Nβ K ;  h ≡ H Nβ H ;  j ≡ J Nβ H ;  q ≡ ν µN (βH − βK ) . 
 
For convenience, we shall refer to y, k, c, and h as scale-adjusted quantities.7 This allows us 
to rewrite scale-adjusted output and human capital as:  
 
KHHKN khay sssF
σσψφθ=  
j = aJ(1−θ )e N (1−ψ )eH (1− φ)e K hη H kη K  
(11a) 
 
(11b) 
 
It is important to specify the dynamics in terms of scale-adjusted variables, since being 
stationary, long-run changes reflect the accumulated effects of policy changes. 
 
The optimality conditions then enable the dynamics to be expressed in terms of these scale-
adjusted variables, as follows. First, substituting (11a) and (11b) into the labor allocation 
                                                 
7Under constant returns to scale these scale-adjusted quantities are just regular per capita quantities. 
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condition, (6b), the human capital allocation condition, (6c), and the physical capital 
allocation condition, (6d), yields the three relationships: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeNJsssNFy ηησσ φψθφψθτ −−−=− −− 1111 11  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeHJsssHFy ηησσ φψθφψθτ −−−=− −− 1111 11  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeKJsssKFy ηησσ φψθφψθτ 11 1111 −− −−−=−  
(12a) 
 
(12b) 
 
(12c) 
 
In principle, we can solve these three relationships for the allocation of labor, human capital, 
and physical capital across sectors: 
 
θ =θ (q(1 − τ y ),h,k);  ∂θ ∂q > 0,  sgn(∂θ ∂h) = sgn(σ H − ηH ), sgn(∂θ ∂k) = sgn(σK − ηK )  
 
ψ = ψ (q(1− τ y),h,k);  ∂ψ ∂q > 0,  sgn(∂ψ ∂h) = sgn(σ H − ηH ), sgn(∂ψ ∂k) = sgn(σ K − ηK )  
 
φ = φ(q(1 −τ y ),h,k);   ∂φ ∂q > 0, sgn(∂φ ∂h) = sgn(σ H −ηH ), sgn(∂φ ∂k) = sgn(σ K −ηK )  
 
(13a) 
 
(13b) 
 
(13c) 
 
Intuitively, an increase in the relative value of physical capital, q, attracts resources to the 
output (capital-producing) sector; labor, human capital, and physical capital therefore move 
from human capital production to final output production. An increase in the stock of either 
form of capital raises the productivity of both sectors in proportion to an amount that 
depends upon the respective productive elasticity. Resources will therefore move toward the 
sector in which that form of capital has the greater production elasticity (is more productive). 
 
Using the optimality conditions, the dynamics of the system can be expressed in terms of the 
redefined stationary variables by: 
 
( ) 

 −−−−= −• n
k
ckhagkk KK
sss
F
KHHKN βδψφθ σσ 11  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]nkhahh HHeeeJ KHHKN βδψφθ ηη −−−−−= −• 1111  
 
(14a) 
 
 
 
(14b) 
 
 
 
 12
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )









−−−−−


−
−−−−



−=
−
−
•
KHKH
sss
Fy
K
eee
J
H
nkhab
khae
qq
KHHKN
KHHKN
δδββψφθτφ
ψφθψ
σσ
ηη
1
1
1
111
1
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 

 −−++−−


= −• nkhabcc KKsssFyK KHHKN 111 1 βγδρψφθτφγ
σσ  
(14c) 
 
 
 
(14d) 
 
where θ (.),  ψ (.),  φ(.)  are determined by (13). To the extent that we are interested in the per 
capita growth rates of physical and human capital, they are given by 
( 1) ;  ( 1)K HK K k k n H H h h nβ β= + − = + −& && & .  
 
The steady state to this system, denoted by "~" superscripts, can be summarized by: 
 
 
(1 − g) ˜ y
˜ k 
− ˜ c˜ k = βKn +δ K  
˜ j 
˜ h 
= βHn + δH  
( ) nb
k
yne
h
j
KK
K
yHH
H βδφτβδψ −−−=−−



− ~~
~
1~1~
~
 
( ) ( )( )nnb
k
y
KKK
K
y βγρβδφτ −−+=−−− 11~~
~
1  
 
(15a) 
 
 
(15b) 
 
 
 
(15c) 
 
 
 
(15d) 
 
together with the two production functions, (11a)-(11b), and the sectoral allocation 
conditions (12).  
 
These nine equations determine the steady-state equilibrium in the following sequential 
manner. First, equation (15b) yields the gross equilibrium growth rate of human capital 
(knowledge), ˜ j ˜ h = ˜ J ˜ H , in terms of the returns to scale, β H , and the rates of population 
growth and depreciation. Next, given ˜ j ˜ h , equations (15c) and (15d) jointly determine the 
sectoral allocation of human capital, ˜ ψ , such that the net rates of return to investing in 
physical capital and human capital are equalized and equal to the rate of return on 
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consumption. Having determined the human capital allocation, ˜ ψ , dividing (12a) and (12c), 
respectively, by (12b) yields the corresponding sectoral allocation of labor, θ~ , and physical 
capital, ˜ φ . With the value for physical capital, ˜ φ , (15d) determines the output-capital ratio. 
Having obtained the output-capital ratio, (15a) determines the consumption-capital ratio 
consistent with the growth rate of capital necessary to equip the growing labor force and 
replace depreciation. Also, given ˜ θ ,  ˜ ψ ,  ˜ φ ,  ˜ y ˜ k  and ˜ j ˜ h , the scale-adjusted production 
functions together determine the stocks of physical capital, k~ , and human capital, ˜ h . 
Finally, having derived ˜ θ ,  ˜ ψ ,  ˜ φ ,  ˜ h ,  ˜ k , any of the three sectoral allocation conditions 
determine the long-run relative shadow value equilibrium of the two assets, q~ , as well as the 
final production value, y~ . 
 
A detailed characterization of the transitional dynamics of our model is provided in the 
Appendix. The dynamics characterizing our analysis are based on the linearization of the 
fourth order system (14). In order for the dynamics to describe a unique stable adjustment 
path, we require that the number of unstable roots equal the number of jump variables (2). 
Unfortunately, the system is too complex to yield intuitive formal stability conditions that 
ensure well-behaved saddle-point behavior. Hence, we shall assume that this condition is 
met, as indeed it is in all of our numerical simulations. For the purposes of this paper, the 
analysis of changes in tax regimes on inequality, using simulation analysis, the formal 
stability conditions are of only secondary importance. 
 
 
3.1. The impact of public policy on inequality 
 
Our concern is to analyze the dynamic response of the economy to changes in income tax 
rates. We seek to go beyond qualitative results and simulate variations in tax rates that reflect 
the significant policy events that occurred in the United States during the 1980s. To 
understand and interpret the adjustments in the economy in response to tax changes, it is 
useful to first derive the qualitative nature of the long-run equilibrium.  
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An immediate manifestation of the non-scale characteristic of the model as seen from 
equations (10a, 10b) is that the steady-state equilibrium growth rates, of both capital goods 
are independent of the tax rate yτ [see Jones 1995, and Eicher and Turnovsky (1999)]. This is 
a major advantage of the model, since the evidence shows no lasting impact of tax policy on 
long run growth (Stokey and Rebelo 1991, Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, Jones, 1995). The fact 
that long run growth is not affected by public policy does not rule out substantial effects of 
tax policy on economic variables in the short and intermediate term. The magnitude of such 
effects depends on the speed of adjustment in the economy. We will address this point 
further in our simulations. 
 
Since taxes do not influence the long run growth the equilibrium sectoral asset allocations, 
θ~ , ψ~  and φ~ , are also independent of the tax rate. From (15d) we know that a lower tax rate 
reduces only the output-capital ratio in the long run, which in turn leads to a lower 
consumption-capital ratio, in order for the equilibrium growth rate of final output to remain 
unchanged. The sectoral allocation may vary significantly during the transition, to impact the 
skill premium, as shown in our simulations. 
 
The impact on the steady-state scale adjusted stocks of physical and human capital are, 
respectively: 
 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] 0111 1 <−−−− −=∂∂ KHHKy Hyk
k
ησηστ
ητ  
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] 0111 <−−−−−=∂∂ KHHKy Kyh
h
ησηστ
ητ  
 
(16a) 
 
 
(16b) 
 
Since one of our goals is to reproduce the real evolution of income inequality as measured by 
the skill premium, wR , in order to get a manageable formulation coming out from our model, 
we have differentiated between the base wage as a reward to raw labor and the reward to 
skills. Hence, 
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(4.17) 
 
where Nw  is the marginal product of unskilled workers (raw labor) and Hr , the marginal 
product of human capital, represents the returns to skills. Essentially, the skill premium is the 
base wage received for raw labor plus the marginal product derived from skills in the final 
goods sector, scaled by the return to raw labor. 
 
The short-run adjustments in the skill premium operate through the short-run allocations of 
raw labor θ  and human capital ψ , as well as the skill adjustment, h. Indeed, in the short-run, 
a tax decrease will initially attract resources to the output producing sector. If raw labor is 
more sectorally mobile than human capital (i.e. θ  responds more intensely than ψ ), then the 
tax cut will be associated with a sharp initial short-run decline in the skill premium, which 
becomes milder as time goes by before ultimately declining over time. 
 
The differential adjustment in the long and short-run of the skill premium is novel to the 
literature. It requires a non-linear transition path that is particular to this strand of growth 
models. Previously the transition speed was constant throughout the entire adjustment, now 
not only the speed of adjustment of different variables may vary at different rates over time, 
but also the variable does not need to transition in a monotonic fashion throughout. 
 
 
4. Response of Skill Premia to Tax Reforms 
 
In this section we report the results of simulating the model. One key question of the growth 
literature is if the theoretical policy guidance is derived from models that are empirically 
relevant. Hence the purpose of the simulations in this section is twofold. First we would like 
to confirm that reasonable parameter values generate plausible steady-state values to key 
economic variables. This would confirm whether this class of models is capable of 
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generating growth rates of output and skills, as well as allocations of resources to the two 
sectors that are reasonable, given observed real world quantities.  
 
Our second purpose is to gain insights into to the qualitative nature of the transition path 
followed by the economy in response to a tax shock. If our benchmark economy replicates 
transition paths that are similar to those observed in the data, our simulations can be taken as 
policy guidance. We will ask how well these transition paths implied by the model correlate 
with to actual observed changes in inequality following changes in the US tax code. As 
mentioned above, our benchmark is the dramatic change in the tax code in the US in the 
1980’s. 
 
It is important to note that the changes over time of the skill premium operate through the 
allocation of labor and skills, θ , ψ , and specially through the evolution of human capital, h. 
An increase in θ  (decrease in the number of raw labor employed in the production of 
knowledge) raises the skill premium, whereas an increase in ψ  (decrease in the number of 
skills employed in the production of human capital) decreases it. 
 
 
Table 1 reports the values we employ for our fundamental parameters. These values are 
generally consistent with those suggested by previous calibration exercises (Lucas, 1988; 
Jones, 1995a; Ortigueira and Santos, 1997), (to the extent that they appear in these models). 
In these first simulations, externalities are set to zero in both sectors, except for the ones 
coming from government spending, G.  
 
 
Table 1. Benchmark parameters 
 
Production parameters 
 
2.0;35.0;45.0;04.0
;3.0;20.0;50.0;1
;2127.0;3723.0;4687.0;2;1.2
====
=======
========
HKNG
HHKKNNJ
HHKKNNFF
bbbc
eeea
sssa
ηηη
σσσα  
Preference parameters ρ = 0.04, γ = 2.5 
Depreciation and population parameters 015.0,05.0,05.0 === nHK δδ  
Fiscal policy parameters %654.11,15.0 )1984( == yg τ  
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Both production functions exhibit constant returns to scale in the private factors of 
production, although the output production function exhibits increasing returns to scale when 
we introduce the government externality. The rate of time preference is 0.04 and the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 0.4. Both capital goods depreciate at 5% and the 
population growth rate is 1.5%. We assume that the government expenditure devoted to 
production is 15%.  
 
The key policy variable we consider is the income tax rate and the experiment we analyze 
and try to replicate are the short-run effects of the accumulated tax cut that occurred in the 
United States between 1980-1995. One of the main drawbacks we face when analyzing 
taxation effects is the one that comes out from the absence of suitable measures of aggregate 
taxation. Following Mendoza et al. (1994) as an alternative suggested by Lucas (1990b) and 
Razin and Sadka (1993), we have used effective tax rates, which relate the effective overall 
tax burden to the main income sources. More specifically, the effective tax ratio on total 
household income, yτ , is calculated as in Mendoza et al. (1994) and Carey and 
Tchilinguirian (2000) as follows: 
 
WPEIOSPUEy ++=
1100τ  
where8: 
 
1100: taxes on income, profit and capital gains of individuals or households; 
OSPUE: unincorporated surplus of private unincorporated enterprises; 
PEI: households’ property and entrepreneurial income; 
W: wages and salaries of dependent employment. 
 
Our benchmark income tax rate is 11.654 percent, corresponding to the effective US tax rate 
in 1984. The model replicates key benchmark equilibrium values of the US economy, as 
reported in table 2: 
                                                 
8 Tax revenue data come from OECD Revenue Statistics; income sources are represented by the variables from 
OECD National Accounts. 
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Table 2. Benchmark equilibrium values 
yτ  θ~  φ~  ψ~  KY /~  YC /~  
11.654 0.8575 0.9213 0.8168 0.3081 0.6355 
 
 
The share of labor allocated to the production of final output is about 86%, the share of 
capital allocated to production is 92 % and about 18% of the skills are used in the education 
sector. The implied equilibrium output-capital ratio is 0.31, and the consumption-output ratio 
is 0.63, both of which are highly plausible. Although less information on the sectoral 
allocation of assets exists, we feel that these fractions are plausible as well, so that in all, the 
model manages to replicate all key variables with relative ease given the standard set of 
assumptions on the fundamental parameters. 
 
Given that the equilibrium dynamics are generated by a fourth-order system, we know from 
Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) that the transition may be characterized by significant non-
monotonicites in the state variables. This implies that both the origin of the economy and the 
size of the tax cut may have an influence on the actual transition to the new steady state. This 
result, only established in simulations in Eicher and Turnovsky (1999), can be explored here 
using data from US tax cuts and skill premium movements.  
 
The key issue here is the response of the economy to changes in the underlying policy 
parameters. We chose to focus on the US economy, where inequality data is available in the 
most complete format, and because the US underwent significant changes in its tax code, 
especially during the Reagan Years 1980-88. We will undertake our analysis for this period 
and up to mid nineties. Figure 1 clearly shows the legacy of the Reagan administration, 
specially concentrated in his first mandate, with substantial tax cuts in 1980-81 from 
15.152% to 14.054%, then to 12.872% in 1982, 12.354% in 1983, 11.654% in 1984 and 
finally 11.031% in 1985. 
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     Figure 1. Effective income taxes 
      Source: Main Aggregates OECD, various years. 
 
 
The time period of the Reagan tax cuts is especially opportune, since skill premium did not 
move much in the mid to last 1970’s, until the Reagan tax reforms were instituted. Then a 
clear long-run upward trend set in, with specific decreases in the years 1981, 1984, 1987 and 
1991; see figure 2. Clearly the effect of taxes on skill premia is a function of time lags and an 
array of interrelated economic factors. However, the model developed above incorporates 
key economic variables, such as investment in education and physical capital. Hence we 
would like to explore how successful the model would be in explaining the marked trend in 
skill premia, which coincides with US tax changes during the same period of time. 
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      Figure 2. US Skill Premium, College/High School  
      Source: US Census Bureau (2000). Mean earnings of workers 18+ by educational attainment. 
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We will start analyzing the dynamics predicted by the model after both a tax decrease and a 
tax increase. Decreasing from 11.654% in 1984 to 11.031% in 1985, the model predicts a 
new steady state as reported in table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Tax reform (decrease) equilibrium values 
yτ  θ~  φ~  ψ~  KY /~  YC /~  
11.031 0.8575 0.9213 0.8168 0.3060 0.6340 
 
 
This steady state differs from the previous one (for 1984 taxes of 11.654 percent) only in the 
capital output and the consumption output ratios. The growth rates of the endogenous factors 
and of the shares of the factors allocated across sectors change only during the transition. 
The output to capital ratio declines by about 0.7% and the consumption to output ratio by 
less, 0.24%. Hence, as the tax on income falls, capital accumulation increases, as saving has 
become more attractive. As capital accumulation increases, so does human capital 
accumulation to maintain the parity in the shadow values of the endogenous variables, since 
the marginal product of skills increases with the accumulation of capital9.  
 
The adjustment of the skill premium shows that it falls down to its long-run value faster than 
without the tax decrease. We can see that coming from the rapid initial decrease, which 
slows down as time goes by. In any case, the interesting part is how a tax decrease is able to 
change the trajectory of the skill premium accelerating its initial decline, thus inequality is 
further reduced than without the tax decrease for several periods. After the policy change, the 
skill premium evolves according to: 
 
 
                                                 
9 The simulations are based on the Mathematica algorithm developed by Eicher and Turnovsky (2001). 
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Figure 3. Skill premium evolution after the 1985 tax decrease (straight line) 
versus skill premium evolution without tax change (dotted line) 
 
 
The key feature of the model driving the impact of tax policy on our measure of income 
inequality, wR , as pointed out before, is the adjustment of human capital, jointly with the 
response of labor allocation, θ , and skills allocation, ψ , across the sectors; see (17). We can 
think of the long-run values of the share of labor and skills in manufacturing as the ones 
corresponding to full employment potential. Recalling (13), we see that on impact a decrease 
in τy  has two effects on employment and skills in the final output sector; θ , ψ . First, given 
q, it increases the after-tax relative price of final output, q(1− τ y) , thereby increasing θ  and 
ψ . But at the same time, it reduces the before-tax relative price q causing an offsetting 
reduction in θ  and ψ . Over time, labor and skills will continue to move in response to the 
changing shadow value, and relative stocks of physical and human capital. During the early 
phases of the adjustment q may continue to decline, thereby offsetting the effect of the 
accumulating capital stock. Yet, the impacts on θ  and ψ  rather offset each other, hence most 
of the adjustment comes from the skill adjustment, h. 
 
The second experiment is similar in nature but has opposite impacts on the US economy. 
Increasing from 11.581% in 1993 to 11.962% in 1994, the model predicts a new steady state 
as shown in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Skill premium 
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Table 4. Tax reform (increase) equilibrium values. 
yτ  θ~  φ~  ψ~  KY /~  YC /~  
11.962 0.8575 0.9213 0.8168 0.3091 0.6362 
 
 
The changes to the steady state are the opposite to the ones above. Again, more interesting 
than the mere comparison of stationary states is the analysis of the transition. The graph of 
the skill premium evolution clearly indicates an adjustment where skill premium initially 
goes up for one period and then begins to go down. Note that for several periods after the tax 
increase, the evolution of the new skill premium remains above the evolution of the skill 
premium prevailing before the tax increase, thus a tax increase brings an increase in 
inequality into the economy.  
 
Such an adjustment depicted here is impossible to replicate with most growth models even in 
transition, because the dimensionality of the dynamics does not allow for such non-linearity 
(see Eicher and Turnovsky, 1999). Given the non-scale structure of the model and the fourth 
order system, transitions are also characterized by a two-dimensional manifold, and hence 
reversals in the trend of the skill premium can possibly be replicated by the model. 
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Figure 4. Skill premium evolution after the 1994 tax increase (straight line) 
versus skill premium evolution without tax change (dotted line) 
 
 
Let’s now have a look at the temporary evolution of the skill premia. Figure 4.5 shows both 
real and simulated skill premia together. In order to come out with the data for the skill 
Skill premium 
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premia using our model, we have proceeded undertaking continuous simulations, one per 
year corresponding to the different annual tax values. We have plugged the yearly effective 
income taxes corresponding to the period 1980-1995 in our model taking as initial values for 
capital and skills for each new tax change the ones after one year of validity of the previous 
tax. This has allowed us to get the corresponding yearly value for skill premia using the 
Mathematica algorithm previously mentioned. 
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      Figure 5. Simulated (dotted line) versus real skill premia 
     (straight line) 
 
Comparing both skill premia, the main feature is that simulated skill premia replicate the 
increasing long-run trend of inequality. Going into more detail, simulated skill premia seem 
to follow the non-monotonic movements of the real skill premia with some exceptions, 
which deserve a comment. Real inequality decreased in 1987, when taxes scarcely moved. 
Besides, the evolution of inequality during the period 1989-91 followed an opposite pattern 
to the movement in taxes. These two exceptions are likely to show the fact that during those 
years, aspects other than taxes, such as economical or institutional, not captured in this model 
simply using tax changes, influenced inequality more than taxes did. Moreover, after the tax 
decrease in 1982, we see how both real and simulated inequality increased. This could be 
showing the lack of effectiveness or the anticipation of the agents after some consecutive tax 
decreases (1980, 1981). 
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Figure 6 compares the evolution of simulated skill premia with real skill premia two periods 
ahead, that is, with taxes having a two-period lagged effect on (simulated) skill premia. 
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     Figure 6. Lagged simulated (dotted line) versus real skill 
     premia (straight line) 
 
 
Now, we can see how our simulated series predicts the 1982-1994 evolution of the real skill 
premia better. The exception is the period 1986-87, where the model seems not to predict 
correctly all the non-monotonicities. 
 
In sum, despite the simplicity of the model, we can get some good insights on the influence 
of taxes on inequality. Generally speaking, it seems that various consecutive tax changes of 
the same sign, specially decreases, may not have the desired initial negative effect on 
inequality, either because agents anticipated the changes and thus these changes have already 
been incorporated in their behavior (changes lose effectiveness), or because there are some 
lagged effects. Besides, it could happen that several tax decreases were not quite credible. In 
any case, there seems to be a mild response to large tax changes, specially to tax decreases, 
confirming some of the results in the literature. 
 
As we have previously said, it is also worth noting that, according to the data, inequality, as 
measured by skill premia, shows a growing long-run trend, which, according to our skill 
premium modelization, can be due to different factors: changes in raw labor and skills 
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elasticities in the output production sector, long-run changes in the share of labor and skills 
in the manufacturing sector, as well as to changes in the ratio N/H (see (17)). Besides, a 
better performance of the economy due to, for instance, higher productivity, could be 
associated to what is called skilled-biased technical change, leading to increasing long-run 
inequality (Krugman, 1994; Wood, 1994; Manacorda and Petrongolo, 1996, 1999; 
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Using a non-scale model leads us to the abandonment of 
the first explanation, though. 
 
One additional aspect subject to analysis would be the response of output to tax changes. 
Intuitively it seems that tax decreases should translate into larger output values through 
higher physical and human capital accumulation, and thus tax increases into lower output 
increases. A large part of the literature tends to argue that taxes, if any, exert a negative 
influence on growth. The positive effect of a tax cut on growth is likely to be higher than the 
negative effect caused by a reduction in the shares of capital and labor also induced 
immediately after the tax cut. As time goes by, the positive effect is reinforced with the 
reverse trend of these shares, which start increasing, thus impinging a higher growth rate on 
the economy. This is what seems to be confirmed here both using real data as well as our 
simulated data. Simulated output has been obtained in a similar way as we obtained the skill 
premium values. Results, as shown in figure 7, using both real and simulated output data 
tend to confirm the likely presence of a negative relation between (one-period lagged) taxes 
and growth, which would show, on the one side, that fiscal policy may be rather effective, 
and, on the other side, the burden that taxes may impinge on the economic performance of an 
economy when not appropriately designed. 
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Figure 7a. Simulated growth (dotted line) versus 
effective income taxes (straight line) 
Figure 7b. Real growth (dotted line) versus 
effective income taxes (straight line) 
 
 
When comparing the evolution of both simulated and real growth, as shown in figure 4.8, we 
can appreciate how the model is capable to capture most of the movements in the growth rate 
with the main exception of the years 1983-85. We have to note, though, that there seems to 
be a one-period lag in the period 1982-1990. In any case, the simulated growth mimics the 
movement of real growth quite closely. 
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         Figure 8. Simulated (dotted line) versus real 
         growth (straight line) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents an alternative explanation for skill premium inequality based on the rich 
dynamics of a non-scale growth model with endogenous skill formation. In this sense, the 
model is capable to replicate the unusual skill premium dynamics of the United States 
economy in the 1980s and half 1990’s. The paper provides thus additional evidence of the 
relevance of non-scale models, indicating that they not only predict the long-run dynamics of 
industrialized countries with remarkable ease, but also indicating that they allow for the non-
linear rich dynamics that are necessary to explain the skill premium movements that took 
place within more than one decade in the US economy. 
 
More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an 
isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. The results we got are in line with the 
expected ones. After a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one 
it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality. On the 
contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the 
trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. 
Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy. 
 
The dynamics of the simulated skill premium mimicked the real US skill premium dynamics 
quite nicely. However, one should bear in mind that it might take some time for an economy 
to wholly absorb policy changes. In this sense, the need for some periods of time to recover 
would probably have offset the different tax cuts that took place consecutively throughout 
the period 1981-85. This fact could give us some insights about the lagged effects of fiscal 
policy, and therefore about the likely need to separate two consecutive tax changes in order 
to capture, at least partially, the effects of both of them. This seems to be confirmed when 
using a two-period lagged influence of taxes on simulated skill premia, since these last ones 
show a closer adjustment to the real values, especially for the period comprising 1982-1994. 
Problems seem to show up again in the first half of the eighties, and thus coming after the 
various large consecutive tax cuts, which reinforces our previous conclusions. 
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On the other hand, the evolution of inequality shows a long-run growing trend, which could 
be due to the joint effect of tax increases and the mild response of the economy to tax 
decreases. These last ones, despite being numerous, could have lost some effectiveness either 
as a result of agents anticipation or given a lower credibility of the agents on tax decreases. 
 
With non-scale models, the long-run equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological 
parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact 
does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It 
indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per 
capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate 
across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.  
 
Finally, while the model predicts rather correctly the skill premium dynamics in the period 
under analysis, as well as the strong increase in investment during that period, it does not 
capture the strong increase in consumption observed over that period, especially relative to 
the level of output. The 1980’s showed a marked decline in the savings rate, which runs 
counter to most economic theories, including Ricardian equivalence. Consumers in our 
model do not have the option to accumulate debt, which became a crucial issue in the 1980’s, 
as credit cards and consumer loans became more prevalent via banking regulations. The 
inclusion of fiscal and personal debt is left for future research. Besides, it would be 
interesting to seek for a further reduction in inequality (measured by skill premia), which, in 
the context of non-scale models with constant elasticity parameters would mainly lead us to 
look for a way to increase the stock of human capital in the long-run relative to the 
population size, maybe allowing for the presence of some externalities in the production of 
skills. Linked to this one, another interesting aspect to analyze would be how to foster a 
higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector 
in the long-run. The introduction of various types of taxes in order to make fiscal policy 
more specific could be a way to pursue this further goal. 
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Appendix 1. Characterization of transitional dynamics 
 
Henceforth we assume that the stability properties are ensured so that we can denote the two 
stable roots by 1µ  and 2µ . The key variables of interest are physical capital, and technology. 
The generic form of the stable solution for these variables is given by: 
 
( ) tt eBeBktk 21 21~ µµ=−  
( ) tt evBevBhth 21 222211~ µµ=−  
(18a) 
(18b) 
 
where 21 , BB  are constants and the vector ( )'4321 iii vvv  2,1=i  (where the prime 
denotes vector transpose) is the normalized eigenvector associated with the stable 
eigenvalue, iµ . The constants, 21 , BB , appearing in the solution (18) are obtained from 
initial conditions, and depend upon the specific shocks. Thus suppose that the economy starts 
out with given initial stocks of capital and knowledge, 00 , hk and through some policy shock 
converges to hk ~,~ . Setting t=0 in (18a), (18b) and letting d ˜ k ≡ ˜ k − k0 ,  d ˜ h ≡ ˜ h − h0 , 21 , BB  are 
given by: 
 
B1 = d
˜ h −ν22d˜ k 
ν22 −ν21 ;  B2 =
ν21d˜ k − d ˜ h 
ν22 − ν21  
(4.19) 
 
When studying the dynamics, we are interested in characterizing the slope along the 
transitional path in h-k space. In general, this is given by: 
 
dh
dk
= B1ν21µ1e
µ 1t + B2ν22µ2eµ2t
B1µ1eµ1t + B2µ2eµ 2t  
(4.20) 
 
and is time varying. Note that since, 210 µµ >>  as ∞→t  this converges to the new steady 
state along the direction dh dk( )t →∞ = ν21 , for all shocks. The initial direction of motion is 
obtained by setting 0=t  in (18) and depends upon the source of the shock. It is convenient 
to express the dynamics of the state variables in phase-space form: 
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(4.21) 
 
By construction, the trace of the matrix in (21) equals 021 <+ µµ  and the determinant 
equals 021 >µµ , so that (21) describes a stable node. The dynamics expressed in (18) and 
(21) are in terms of the scale-adjusted quantities, from which the growth rates of per capita 
capital and knowledge can be derived.10  
 
Equations (18a) and (18b) highlight the fact that with the transition path in k and h being 
governed by two stable eigenvalues, the speeds of adjustment for capital and skills are 
neither constant nor equal over time. In addition, with output being determined by capital 
and knowledge, the transition of output is also not constant over time, but a simple composite 
of the transition characteristics of h and k as determined in (21). 
                                                 
10Note that the representation of the transitional dynamics in h-k space takes full account of the feedbacks 
arising from the jump variables, q and c; these are incorporated in the two eigenvalues.  
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Appendix 2. Graphical evolution of the shares of labor, physical capital and human 
capital in the manufacturing sector after a tax change. 
 
A.2.1. Tax decrease from 11.654% to 11.031 (1984-1985) 
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A.2.2. Tax increase from 11.581% to 11.962% (1993-1994) 
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